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Absence Without Leav:e - The Nature Of The O:flense
<

:By: :Captain Fredric I. Lederer, Instructor, Criminal Law Divisim, ,T J AGSA
I

Of.all the varied punitive articles within the
UCMJ, Article 86, AWOL, seems ·.to be the
mainstay · of the military lawyer's practice.
Curiously enough this appears to have also
been true in other eras 1 and nations 2 • as well.
Indeed, AWOL as an offense dates .back at
least to the Articles of War of Richard II pro-

.

-

'

mulgated in 1385. 3 ·Despite this long hallowed
tradition, counsel frequently ·consider AWOL
prosecutions uninteresting and prof~ssionally
unrewarding ..While thi~l· m~y be eas'iiy understandable (AWOL does lackthe "glamor" and
challenge presented by other' equally traditional offenses such ~s . pillag~, 'looting~ and

5
rapine) it may unfortunately result in counsel
taking the offense for granted. The numerous
appellate decisions defining the offense of
AWOL--;..(Article 86(3))-in simplistic/ but
highly misleading terms, compounded · the
problem. Consequently, an analysis of the offense with particular attention to the Court of
Military Appeals' latest pronouncement in this
area in United States v. Lynch 4 appears
merited.
Absent without'leave h~s been ·said to be
committed on the day of th~ inception ·o f the
11 All time subsequent to the initial ababsence.
•
.·.
I
.
.
sence is said to constitute pnly aggravation,
important
only for considerations
of maxi.
. I
..
mum sentence. 8 Numerous authorities, thus
have recited the statement that "AWOL is not
a continuing offense!' This has led to the occasional use of the term '~instantaneous" to
describe the nature of the offense. If AWOL is
viewed in this fashion-as complete u-pOn the
soldier's
unauthorized depar."\t ure from his ·unit'
. :·
--certain logical consequen<:es would seem to
follow. First, consider thi~ hypotheti~al. If
the . accused is' ·charged' .withi ' AWOL
from his.
.
unit from on or about 1 January 1974 until
on or about 30 .June 1974, it is logical to presume that the offense charged is AWOL on or
about 1 January 1974. Thus if AWOL is ''instantaneous" and ·.the prosecution, due to failure of proof, can prove only the termination
date; the accused should be acquitted since the
termination date, .although part of the aggravating period, is a different offense than the
inception date. Second, if AWOL is complete
upon ·the actual inception, the statute of limitations should run from the actual (as against
the date the prosecution may choose to prove)
inception date. Third, for ·former jeopardy
purposes acquittal at trial of .an inception date
should not bar retrial for a new inception date
subsequent to the first date-although within
that date's period of aggravation.
r
1

.

.

.

.
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Unfortunately the Manual for CourtsMartial and the .appellate courts have indicated that only the second -conclusion dealing
with the statute of limitations 8 is correct. In

other words, the "instantaneous" model for
AWOL is . not consistent fact situations. We
must, therefore, conti:ime the search for ·:a
description of the nature of the AWOL offense.
The rules of pleading for Article 86(3) are
well known and need not be discussed at
length. It suffices to point out' that some inception date must be pleaded; Matters of proof
are somewhat more complicated. If the government is unable toprove :the pleaded inception date,, but can · prove either the pleaded
termination date or any other date within the
single pleaded period of the specification, 9 the
accused may be convicted (by exceptions and
substitutions) of an AWOL with a new inception date. This is true not only where the
usual failure of proof occurs but also for the
extremely rare case in which the accused establishes a defense of rnental irresponsibility
to the initial part of the ·charged AWOL
period. 10 While the prosecution may prove any
date within the pleaded time period, it may
not create a second offense from the same
period. In other words, if' the · evidence shows
that the accused returned to military control
during -the charged period ' and again absented
himself, the court may not find him guilty of
the second absence either alone or in conj unction with the first. 11
These rules further undermine the "instantaneous" model of AWOL; Since an accused may be convicted of any inception date
within the charged period-despite its ·even
extreme length and despite defense objections
claiming fatal variance from the pleaded inception date-AWOL cannot be considered as
an "instantaneous" offense. Rather it appears
more correct to describe the offense as a
course of conduct. While the offense is complete upon the absence for purposes of proof,
it is incorrect to say that the rest of the time
period is important only for aggravation. At
the same time AWOL is not what has been
called a "renewed" 12 offense because every
day of the alleged period cannot be a separate
chargeable offense for statute of limitations
and former jeopardy purposes.
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. The.Manual for Courts-Martial states clear,.
ly that the statute of limitations runs from
the inception date of the absence · because
AWOL is inot a "continuing" offense and is
~·committed, respectively, on the date the person absents himself." 13 This language raises
the possibility that the · defense can affirmatively prove an earlier inception date to raise
the defense of statute of limitations. If PVT
Doe .is charged on 28 December 1973 . with
AWOL from 1 January 1972 until 15 December 1973, the statute of limitations would .bar
prosecution for an AWOL beginning prior to
28 December 1971. It .would appear perfectly
proper for . the defense to prove that the
AWOL actually began on 1 December 1971it could then argue that prosecution for the
entire period was barred by the statute ·of
limitations. It is important to note that despite
the Manual's language, this result is consistent with a conception of AWOL as a course of
conduct. The inception date is vital, for it defines the .offense in its most .basic sense. However, .the offense includes the remainder. of the
. period for proper definition, otherwise every
individual day would constitute an offense and
the prosecution . could select any date within
the period. If that date ·were not barred by
the statute, a successful prosecution would result despite the date of the actual ,inception,
. For purposes of former jeopardy, AWOL is
also treated as a course of ·conduct. In United
States v. Hayes, 14 the accused was charged
with desertion from 1 May 1952 until l l June
1953. At trial the defense showed that the accused had earlier been convicted 15 of AWOL
from 1 May 1953 until .11 June 1953. Hayes
was then convicted of. desertio:p from 1 May
1952 until 30.Apri11953. On appeal, the Navy
Board of Review held that it had been error
for the trial court to simplr exempt the period
covered by the AWOL offense. The Board
stated that ·"within th~ same period of un.autkorized absence any lesser period of unauthorized absence is the same offense but of
Jesser :gravity." 16 The court ·argued that this
result fo1lowed necessarily from the fact that
AWOL is not a continuing offense. The recent

Court of Military ·.Appeals decision~ United
States v. Lynch, 17 appears to follow Hayes.lri
Lynch, ·the accused was initially charged with
AWOL from Special ·Processing Company,
Special Troops, Fort Leonard Wood, froni .on
or about 7 November 1969, until on or about 7
January 1971. At trial at Fort Sill, .the defense
showed that the accused had been apprehended by civilian authorities on 7 November 1969,
and ultimately returned to military authority,
The military judge acquitted the accused. 18
Within the week, Lynch . was charged with
AWOL from SpeCial Processing Detachment,
Fort Sill, from on or about 27 November 1969,
until on or about 7 ·January 1971. At the
second trial, the military judge denied the de~
fense's motio'n to dismiss the charge and speci.:
fication on grounds of former jeopardy because the "offense of unauthorized absence is
not a 'continuing one'." 19 On appeal the Government claimed that former jeopardy did not
apply because Lynch had been prosecuted for
a · different offehs~ each time. Two' theotiE:is
were . urged-firstly, that !. different units were
involved each time,·and ~econdly, that AWOL
is not .a continuing offense and that, therefore
the acquittal was irrelevant to the second ' set
ofcharges which, dealing with a new incep.
tion .date, dealt with a new, offense.
The Court of Review reversed the conviction, .stating that the apparent variance between units was inconsequential because at
the time of the second trial, Lynch, while att~ched to Fort Sill, remained assigned to Fort
Leonard Wood and his alleged absence could
have been prosecuted for AWOL from either
unit.20 Turning to the claim that different offenses were involved because different inception dates were charged, the court stated that
the first trial apparently involved an AWOL
running .from 7 November until return of
Lynch to military authorities on 24 November
1969, and that the holding of United States v.
Reeder 21 preventing the carving out of a second AWOL from a single period was applicable. Using Reeder · as ·.precedent and finding
that the doctrine of AWOL as a completed of.;
fense on the date of inception had the effect of
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benefiting the accused via the statute of limitations, the court held that acquittal of an
AWOL period barred prosecution at "a subsequent trial for a lesser period of unauthorized absence contained within the dates of the
period of which he was acquitted." 22
Upon certification by The Judge Advocate
General, the Court of Military Appeals affirmed the decision of the Court of Review. 23 Its
opinion was somewhat more expansive, however. It indicated that "the Government's insistence that the court's decision is 'inconsist-.
ent' with our iterated pronouncement that
'absence without leave is not a continuing offense,' ... impels a separate statement." 24 A
continuous offense, said the court, had been
defined as "a continuous unlawful act or series
of acts set on foot (sic) by a single impulse
and operated by an unintermittent force, however long a time it may occupy." 25 AWOL is
not a continuing offense in the sense that the
offense was complete upon unauthorized departure from the unit. However, the length of
the offense is essential, according to Judge
Quinn's opinion, not only for determining the
maximum legal punishment but also in that
the single charged time period may not be
fragmented into two or more periods for
jeopardy purposes. Because one "cannot be
prosecuted and punished for an act which is
'part and parcel' of an offense for which he
was previously convicted and punished,'' 26 the
first acquittal barred retrial for any time
period contained within the first set of
charges. 27
Unfortunately, the Army Court of Military
Review decision in United States v. Espinosa 28 shows that Lynch has not settled this
area of law. Espinosa concerned an accused
charged with AWOL from 15 May 1971 until
26 February 1973. At trial the defense proved
that the accused had terminated the absence
on 31 July 1971 and had then again absented
himself. Apparently to save the longer period,
the trial judge found Espinosa guilty by exceptions and substitutions of the second
period beginning on 31 July, and acquitted

.him of the 15 May 1971 to 31 July period. On
appeal the Court of Review set· aside the findings of guilty, holding that the judge could
have convicted Espinosa only of the first
period and that the second period constituted
an "uncharged offense'' which could be the
subject of a retrial. Retrial of the first period
was barred by the acquittal. As written, the
Court of Review's opinion is difficult to understand. Despite its statement that the trial
judge "was not obliged to make any findings
as to the uncharged offense commencing on 31
July,'' it would appear that current procedure
would indeed require the trial judge to acquit
an accused of the second period. While Lynch
discussed the two absences within one specification problem, 29 it did so within the context
of an outright acquittal for the entire period.
Thus, while Lynch may not be dispositive of
the issue generally, until a new form of procedure is devised that does not result in an acquittal of the second absence during the first
trial, it would appear that Lynch would bar
retrial for the second absence.

Lynch and Espinosa are illustrative. of the
weaknesses of the simplistic "instantaneous"
definitions of AWOL. AWOL is an "instantaneous" offense for some purposes and a
"continuous" 30 one for others. Obviously,
what is involved is a question of semantics. It
would be best if, rather than analyzing AWOL
issues by ·means of a single multi-purpose
model of the offense's nature, counsel focused
directly on the result the decided cases have
reached on the pleading, proof, statute of limitations and former jeopardy problems presented by AWOL cases. One improvement in
the conceptual framework can be suggested,
however. If AWOL is viewed as an offense
which included duration as a basic part of the
offense, all of the cases appear consistent. The
inception date will indicate the beginning of
the period-the critical date for statute of
limitations purposes and the first date for
which the accused may be convicted. The duration will allow the government within the
single charged period to prove (as if by election) any "inception date," because while
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each day is not a new offense, 31 the government may prove the accusedwas.in an AWOL
status beginning on any date within the
charged period. However, having done so, the
accused at a second trial will have a plea of
former jeopardy as to any period included in
the period originally charged regardless of the
final. outcome at the first trial. Thus to the extent that any catchphrase can be used to describe AWOL, it might be well to describe
AWOL .as a "course of conduct." 32 Using a
course of conduct as. a model, counsel will be
better able to predict the legal consequences of
any given set of AWOL facts while escaping
the erroneous conclusions that follow from use
of misleading labels.
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